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Abstract—Mobile cyber-physical systems, such as automobiles,
drones and robotic vehicles, are gradually becoming attractive
targets for cyber attacks. This is a challenge because intrusion
detection systems built for conventional computer systems tend to
be unsuitable. They can be too demanding for resource-restricted
cyber-physical systems or too inaccurate due to the lack of real-
world data on actual attack behaviours. Here, we focus on the
security of a small remote-controlled robotic vehicle. Having
observed that certain types of cyber attacks against it exhibit
physical impact, we have developed an intrusion detection system
that takes into account not only cyber input features, such as
network traffic and disk data, but also physical input features,
such as speed, physical jittering and power consumption. As
the system is resource-restricted, we have opted for a decision
tree-based approach for generating simple detection rules, which
we evaluate against denial of service and command injection
attacks. We observe that the addition of physical input features
can markedly reduce the false positive rate and increase the
overall accuracy of the detection.
Index Terms—Cyber-physical systems; Mobile robots; Intru-
sion detection; Decision tree; Cyber-physical attack; Network
security; Denial of service (DoS); Command injection
I. INTRODUCTION
While physical damage has been traditionally caused by
physical means and cyber damage by cyber means, our in-
creasing dependence on highly automated and networked sys-
tems, from industrial control to robotic vehicles, has generated
formidable cyber-physical vulnerabilities. The operation of
robotic vehicles often depends heavily on computer networks.
A cyber-attack against or through an associated network
affects the movement of a vehicle in a manner that gives rise
to a range of new security challenges. Such incidents have
already been reported to have occurred both in the wild [1],
[2] and in controlled experimental environments [3], [4] and
competitions [5].
Cyber-physical attacks are defined as security breaches in
cyberspace that adversely affect physical space [1]. Here, we
focus on denial of service attacks [6] that can affect robotic
vehicles by delaying or preventing commands from reaching
their movement control system, as well as command injection
attacks that provide the robot with conflicting control com-
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mands. Our aim is to provide mechanisms for such vehicles
to rapidly and accurately detect that they are under attack.
The vast majority of cyber-physical security research has
focused on industrial control systems. Such systems are in-
herently predictable. They perform routine operations and any
deviation of the network traffic from an expected behaviour
can be flagged as suspicious. We argue that the uncertain
environment in which robotic vehicles operate makes them
less predictable. This is more so for vehicles that are not
autonomous but controlled by a user over a communication
channel. In previous research, we have identified that, depend-
ing on implementation approach and attack type, a robot under
a denial of service attack on its communication channel might
be forced to shut down, to continue moving blindly, to jitter, or
to d lay changing direction [7], [8] etc. Here, we try to make
use of these physical manifestations of two practically usable
cyber attacks [9]: denial of service and command injection
to investigate whether we can use them meaningfully as part
of an on-board intrusion detection system. We refer to these
as physical input features. As cyber input features we refer
to the ones traditionally used in intrusion detection, such as
inbound and outbound network rates, CPU usage, disk activity
etc. Following the terminology proposed by Mitchell and Chen
[10] for intrusion detection of cyber-physical systems, we
evaluate the combined use of cyber and physical input features
on a knowledge-based machine learning algorithm.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Cyber security in vehicles is a relatively new area of
study. Relevant research has focused primarily on proof-of-
concept attacks [3] on the integrity of sensing and actuation
or the availability of communications. Defence is usually about
resilience through redundancy [11] or prevention through
authentication and encrypted communication [12]. Here, we
place our attention instead on the few examples of research on
intrusion detection techniques designed specifically for mobile
cyber physical and robotic systems (Table I).
Depending on its architecture and application, a robotic
vehicle may be able to benefit from communication with other
agents (multi-agent) or may need to rely solely on its own
sensing capabilities and monitoring processes (single-agent).
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TABLE I
INTRUSION DETECTION APPROACHES FOR ROBOTIC AND MOBILE CYBERPHYSICAL SYSTEMS
Ref. Type Comms Location Attack Types Input Features Detection approach
Mitchell, Chen
[13], [14], [15] Mobile CPS Wireless
Host Based,
Network Based
Bad Command Injection,
Node Hijack
Position,
Battery Exhaustion Rate
Nodes Compromised
Dynamic IDS Voting,
Positional Discontinuity,
Enviroconsistency
Fagiolini et al.
[16], [17]
Multi-Robot
System Wireless
Host Based,
Decentralized Misbehaviour
Node Reputation,
Behaviour score,
Distance Estimation
Clustered Monitoring,
Voting
Bonaci et al.
[18]
Robotic
Surgery System Wired
Host Based,
Network Based
Intent Modification,
Control Hijack
Motor Performance,
Network Performance
Recommendations
for Network Monitoring
Shetty et al.
[19]
Multi-Robot
System Wireless
Host Based,
Network Based
Decentralized
Denial Of
Service
Lack of
Connectivity Network Monitoring
Vuong et al.
[7]
Remote-
controlled
Robot
Wired Host Based Denial OfService
Motor Performance,
Network Peformance Rule-based
Zeng et al.
[20]
Fagiolini et al.
[21]
Bicchi et al.
[22]
Multi-Robot
System Wireless
Host Based,
Role Based
Network Based
Decentralized
Node Failure,
Node Misbehaviour
Network Performance,
Behaviour Score,
Node Reputation,
Neighbour State,
Neighbour Actions,
System Configuration,
Agent Position
Reputation Based,
Consensus Based,
Set-Valued Consensus
Multi-agent approaches focus on coordination between differ-
ent agents (e.g, between different driverless vehicles or robots
[19]) in their effort to detect one agent’s suspicious actions,
reports, configuration or location. The detection criteria may
include consistency with the laws of physics (e.g., velocity
measurements that are physically possible, or location that is
consistent with the velocity measured [1]), consistency with
the sensor measurements reported by neighbouring agents
[13], voting [23], reputation scores etc.
Most of these approaches and detection criteria become
impractical in single-agent systems, such as the single remote-
controlled robotic system used here. Without the opportunity
to coordinate with multiple other robots, the focus has to
shift to the identification of relevant characteristics that can
be measured by its own on-board systems.
III. TESTBED
The robotic vehicle that we use as our testbed is illustrated
in Figure 1. It is a four-wheel-drive robot controlled via an
on-board Intel Atom computer running the Linux operating
system. An Arduino micro-controller is responsible for driving
the robots motors. The robot is also equipped with a pan/tilt
camera for remote navigation and situational awareness. Re-
mote control of the robot can be via Ethernet cable or Wi-
Fi, by relaying commands received over a TCP socket to
the robots control board. The two rear wheel motors are
fitted with magnetic encoders, which provide information on
the angular position of each wheel. A detailed schematic of
the components of the robot is shown in Figure 2, which
also highlights the cyber and physical input features that
are collected from different components for the purposes of
intrusion detection.
Fig. 1. The testbed system
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND SCENARIOS
Our first aim is to establish whether meaningful detection
is feasible with physical input features or, more likely, by
combining cyber and physical input features. For this reason,
we start with simplified conditions and attack scenarios. To
reduce the variable effect of friction, the robot is placed on a
stand during the experiments. This also helps with repeatability
of scenarios that involve movement with different speeds and
different duration in the same laboratory environment. For an
effective communication between operator and robot as well as
the attacker, we utilise both wired and Wi-Fi communications
during the experiment. Finally, for consistency across different
scenarios, we power the robot via DC power supply rather than
its on-board battery pack. The depletion rate of the latter would
affect the consistency of the motors’ power and consequently
of any measurements coming from the encoders.
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Following the same logic of simplified conditions, we con-
duct experiments where the robot can be in normal operation
(no attack), under denial of service (DoS) attack, or under
command injection attack, as shown in Table II.
TABLE II
THE FIVE SCENARIOS TESTED EXPERIMENTALLY
Scenario s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
Description DoS
Data
Injection
”STOP”
Data
Injection
”LEFT”
Stronger
DoS from
two PCs
No attack.
Normal
traffic
Duration 307 s 173 s 79 s 29 s 221 s
A. Denial of Service attack (S1, S4)
The robot is in normal operation and under attack, while it
is periodically moving and stopping, as shown in scenarios s1
and s4. For this part, we limit the experimentation to setting
the robot to move in a straight line and at constant speed and
to halt repeatedly. The attack is a simple denial of service
attack at a bit rate of approximately 8.7 MBit/s originating
from an attacking machine. For a stronger DoS attack, we use
a second PC to direct further illegitimate network traffic to
the robot. The aim of the attack is to flood the robots network
interface with TCP traffic.
B. Command injection attack (S2, S3)
Under this attack the robot receives commands to move for-
ward from its legitimate operator, as well as “stop” commands
from an attacker, as in scenario s2, or “turn left” commands
from an attacker, as in scenario s3.
C. Normal operation (S5)
Here, there is no attack. The only network traffic involved
has to do with transmitting camera feed to the operator and
receiving the operator’s legitimate commands. This is shown
in scenario 5.
V. INTRUSION DETECTION USING DECISION TREES
In our previous work [7], we have identified the need for a
robust classification method for behavioural characteristics of
a robotic vehicle under attack using both physical and cyber
input features. Towards this goal, we start our investigation
with a knowledge-based approach, which depends on the
existence of a known attack pattern. As an example of such
an approach, we use a decision tree-based algorithm, as in
[24]. Decision Tree machine learning is a common method for
classifying data with high speed, strong learning ability and
simple construction [25]. We have selected the Decision Tree
C5.0 to define the rule set for detecting the physical impact as
well as the cyber attack on the robotic vehicle testbed. Before
applying our C5.0 detection mechanism, we start with a data
collection phase (Section V-A).
Fig. 2. Detailed diagram of the testbed. The input features used for the
detection are shown in black background
A. Data collection and preparation
We have collected data for eight input features. Four of
these are for communication and processing, which we refer
to as the cyber input features, and four are for the physical
properties of the robot, which we refer to as the physical input
features. Each feature is designed to log its value at a specific
time within a cycle (period of time T). Table III summarises
these. In short, [NET]RxKBTot and [NET]TxKBTot corre-
spond to the received and transmitted network traffic rates;
[CPU]Totl% is the CPU utilisation; [DSK]WriteKBTot is the
rate that files are written to the disk; DiffLEncoder represents
the wheel speed; RMS of (x,y,z) represents the vibration
of the chassis (using accelerometer measurements); Watts
corresponds to power consumption; and Amps corresponds to
current.
The data collection occurs at several different locations
within the architecture, as shown in Fig. 2. For example, the
encoder value is collected by monitoring scripts embedded
within the robot control unit, while Watts and Amps are
measured with the WattsUp device [26]. As a result, we have
had to process the data offline to address the synchronisation
difference between the clocks of these different data collection
devices, and to use linear interpolation for devices that would
collect data at different time intervals to each other (see Table
III - column “Period”). Figures 3 (cyber) and 4 (physical)
show a representative run of the experiments using the data
after clock synchronisation and interpolation in R.
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TABLE III
COLLECTED CYBER AND PHYSICAL FEATURES WITH TIME CYCLE
Type Feature name Period (T)
Cyber Network [NET]RxKBTot 1.0 s
Network [NET]TxKBTot 1.0 s
CPU Data [CPU]Totl% 1.0 s
Disk Data [DSK]WriteKBTot 1.0 s
Physical Encoder DiffEncoderL 30 ms
Accelerometer RMS of (x,y,z) 20 ms
Power Watts 1.0 s
Current Amps 1.0 s
Fig. 3. The data for cyber features collected during the five scenarios (denoted
as S1 - S5, and presented one after the other). The overlaid frames denote the
periods of time that a cyber attack (denial of service or command injection)
is on. Note that there is no attack in S5.
B. Detection mechanism
Our goal here is (i) to provide a mechanism that can detect
a cyber attack against a robotic vehicle and (ii) to explore
whether the addition of physical input features can improve its
effectiveness. As a representative approach, we used a decision
tree learning algorithm for automatically producing detection
rules that will be used by the robotic vehicle.
Fig. 4. The data for physical features collected during the five scenarios
(denoted as S1 - S5, and presented one after the other). The overlaid frames
denote the periods of time that a cyber attack (denial of service or command
injection) is on. Note that there is no attack in S5.
1) Method: The Decision Tree C5.0 was chosen as the
updated version of C4.5, which is improved in terms of
speed, memory and efficiency. We used the C5.0 package
[27] in R to execute this algorithm. The dataset collected
in our experiments had 40,454 data points for each feature.
We randomly chose 30% of the data points of the initial
attack scenarios (s1 for denial of service, and s2 for command
injection) for training and the rest (70% of S1, 70% of S2, and
the whole of S3, S4, S5) for testing. In the training datasets,
we add the learning flag of the algorithm, which is true when
the “ground truth” is that there is an attack and false when
there is no attack.
2) Feature selection: In line with the second of our goals,
we allow our learning algorithm to use all or subsets of our
available input features:
• Set 1: All eight cyber and physical features
• Set 2: The four cyber features only
• Set 3: The four physical features only
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3) Decision Tree model: With each set of features, we fit
a Decision Tree model using Quinlan’s C5.0 algorithm on the
training data. A sample of the tree is depicted in Figure 5. For
a given testing data, the attribute usage shows the contribution
of features in percentage within the rule-set. Table IV shows
the different usages amongst cyber and physical input features
for the three different sets above.
Fig. 5. A section of Decision Tree rules generated
VI. EVALUATION
A. Detection accuracy
After creating the Decision Tree model based on the training
data, we evaluate the model by measuring the accuracy of
the generated set of rules on the test data. The evaluation
relates to the rate of false positives (FPR) and false negatives
(FNR) returned with regards to the “ground truth” (as shown
by the overlaid frames in Figures 3 and 4, as well as the
overall accuracy rate (ACC) of the specific decision tree.
In addition, we use Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
curves, plotting the true positive rate (TPR) against the FPR
for different thresholds as in Figure 6. In an ideal detection
result, the curve should have a point (0,1) where the FPR is
0% and TPR is 100%, while the line between (0,0) and (1,1)
corresponds to random guess. The metric that represents the
quality of detection of the decision based approach is the area
under curve (AUC) of the ROC curves.
B. Results
As mentioned in Section V-B2, the experiment consisted of
building three decision trees with different sets of features for
denial of service and command injection attack detection.
As shown in Table IV, detection based on physical fea-
tures only is rather poor (albeit better than random guess).
Nevertheless, including physical features together with cyber
features provides considerably better results than using only
cyber features with regards to ACC and FPR, but is worse
in terms of FNR. In terms of the features utilised the most
TABLE IV
DOS AND COMMAND INJECTION DETECTION RESULTS
Features Attribute usage FP% FN% ACC%
All Cyber &
Physical (8)
100.00% RxKBTot
99.63% Amps
61.93% Watts
17.53% TxKBTot
5.15% CPU
3.03% WriteKBTot
0.88% DiffEncoderL
4.56 8.76 93.81
Cyber
features
only (4)
100.00% RxKBTot
60.93% CPU
5.31% WriteKBTot
0.50% TxKBTot
25.91 3.45 82.81
Physical
features
only (4)
100.00% Watts
85.57% Amps
85.26% DiffEncoderL
71.50% RMS
50.21 12.59 64.40
by the decision tree approach, these are the network incom-
ing traffic rate ([NET]RxKBTot) and the energy-related ones
(Amps and Watts). While increased vibration of the chassis is
visually observed during some of these attacks, this feature is
utilised less by the decision tree algorithm. If we remove the
physical features, then the algorithm relies almost exclusively
on [NET]RxKBTot and the CPU utilisation.
The benefits of adding the physical input features are
more clearly seen in Figure 6. Using the ROCR package in
R [28], we compare the performance for the three sets of
features: cyber and physical; cyber only; and physical only.
The three ROC curves in Figure 6 show different TPR, and
FNR for different probability thresholds. As can be observed,
the area under the curve (AUC) is considerable higher when all
eight features are utilised (96.79%) than when only the cyber
features (82.38%) or only the physical features are utilised
(69.31%). Figure 7 summarises the results for FPR, FNR, ACC
and AUC in a single bar chart.
Fig. 6. The ROC curves of the detection rules for the three sets of features:
Both cyber and physical; cyber only; and physical only. The (0.0) to (1.1)
line is the random guess line.
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We consider these results to be promising. As expected,
cyber features play the most dominant role in the detection
rules identified by the decision tree algorithm. With different
training data sets, the decision tree algorithm may provide
different rulesets, but it is important to note that the inclusion
of physical features has proven beneficial in all experiments
conducted regardless of the particular choice of ruleset.
Fig. 7. FPR, FNR, Accuracy and Area Under Curve (AUC) for the three sets
of features: Both cyber and physical; cyber only; and physical only.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Intrusion detection for cyber-physical systems is a relatively
new area of research. It has been explored to some extent
for industrial control systems, but remains at an early stage
for mobile cyber-physical systems such as robotic vehicles.
Through experimentation, we have observed that different
attacks have different impacts on the operation of the robot,
and this includes both its cyber (network, CPU, disk data)
and physical behaviour (speed, vibration, power consumption).
This presents an opportunity, as by leveraging both types of
features, one can improve the accuracy of the detection of
an attack. We have validated this for an intrusion detection
approach based on decision trees and the C5.0 algorithm.
Our next step is to extend the scope of our experiments by
applying the same approach on different attack types [9], such
as malware infection and communication jamming. We are
also working towards testing the hypothesis that the addition of
physical input features can improve the accuracy and detection
latency of behaviour-based detection approaches, which are
more suitable than knowledge-based approaches for zero-day
cyber-physical attacks.
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